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A secret key shared through quantum key distribution between two cooperative players is secure
against any eavesdropping attack allowed by the laws of physics. Yet, such a key can be established
only when the quantum channel error rate due to eavesdropping or imperfect apparatus is low. Here,
I report a practical quantum key distribution scheme making use of an adaptive privacy amplification
procedure with two-way classical communication. Then, I prove that the scheme generates a secret
key whenever the bit error rate of the quantum channel is less than 0.5 − 0.1
√
5 ≈ 27.6%, thereby
making it the most error resistant scheme known to date.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 89.20.Ff, 89.70.+c
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is the process of
sharing a secret bit string, known as the key, between two
cooperative players, commonly called Alice and Bob, by
exchanging quantum signals. Since an unknown quantum
state cannot be perfectly cloned [1, 2], any eavesdropping
attempt by Eve will almost surely disturb the transmit-
ted quantum states. Thus, by carefully estimating the
error rate of the transmitted quantum states, Alice and
Bob know with great confidence the quantum channel
error rate, which in turn reflects the eavesdropping rate.
(In contrast, Alice and Bob can never be sure if Eve has
eavesdropped in classical key distribution because classi-
cal signals can be copied without being caught in prin-
ciple.) If the estimated eavesdropping rate is high, they
abort the scheme and start over again. On the other
hand, if the estimated eavesdropping rate is low, privacy
amplification procedure such as quantum error correction
or entanglement purification can be used to distill out an
almost perfectly secure key [3, 4, 5].
It is instructive to devise a secure QKD scheme that
tolerates as high a quantum channel error rate as possible
and subject that scheme to a vigorous cryptanalysis. In-
deed, Mayers [5] and Biham et al. [6] proved the security
of the so-called BB84 QKD scheme [7] against all kinds of
attack allowed by the laws of quantum physics. Follow-
ing Mayers’ proof, a provably secure key is established
whenever the channel error rate is less than about 7%.
Lo and Chau proved the security of an entanglement-
based QKD scheme [3]. By scrambling the qubits before
transmission and using the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov
argument for a general quantum stabilizer code [8], the
Lo and Chau scheme tolerates up to about 18.9% chan-
nel error. Nonetheless, the Lo and Chau scheme requires
quantum computers and hence is not practical at the
present moment. By beautifully combining the essences
of the Mayers as well as Lo and Chau proofs, Shor and
Preskill gave an ingenious security proof of the BB84
scheme that applies up to 11.0% channel error [9]. The
most error resistant QKD scheme known to date was
recently found by Gottesman and Lo. Built upon the
Shor-Preskill proof, Gottesman and Lo showed that a
carefully designed privacy amplification procedure with
two-way communication increases the error tolerant level
of a QKD scheme. In particular, they proved that the six-
state QKD scheme introduced by Bruß [10] tolerates up
to about 23.7% bit error rate (or equivalently up to about
35.5% channel error rate) [11]. Recently, Gottesman and
Lo further improved their two-way communication pro-
tocol and showed that it generates a provably secure key
up to 26.4% bit error rate [12]. (Here, the channel error
rate and bit error rate refer to the rate of quantum and
spin flip errors occurring in the insecure noisy quantum
channel respectively.)
Here, I report an adaptive privacy amplification proce-
dure for the six-state scheme. Then, I prove that this pro-
cedure enables the six-state scheme to generate a prov-
ably secure key up to 0.5− 0.1√5 ≈ 27.6% bit error rate
(or equivalently up to 0.75 − 0.15√5 ≈ 41.4% quantum
channel error), breaking the 26.4% bit error rate record of
Gottesman and Lo. This scheme is also practical, requir-
ing no quantum computer or search for asymptotically
good quantum codes. Since no BB84-based scheme can
tolerate more than 25% bit error rate [12], the 27.6% bit
error rate tolerable six-state scheme reported here con-
vincingly demonstrates the advantage in error tolerability
of the six-state scheme over BB84.
Before reporting the adaptive procedure, let me briefly
review the privacy amplification procedure introduced
by Gottesman and Lo [11]. In the first step of the
Gottesman-Lo privacy amplification procedure, Alice
and Bob perform entanglement purification with local
quantum operation and two-way classical communication
(LOCC2 EP). Specifically, they randomly pair up their
corresponding bits in the string and compare the result of
a bilateral exclusive or (BXOR) in each pair. They keep
their corresponding control bits in each pair only if their
parities agree. In the second step, Alice and Bob apply
the [3, 1, 3]2 phase error correction (PEC). This is equiv-
alent to randomly forming trios of the remaining bits and
replace each trio by their corresponding parities [11]. Al-
2ice and Bob apply LOCC2 EP and PEC alternatively
until the error rate of the resultant signal can be handled
by an asymmetric Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quan-
tum code [13, 14] with great confidence. Then, they ap-
ply the Shor-Preskill error correction procedure [9] to the
remaining bits using the above CSS code. By doing so,
they end up sharing a secret key with exponentially close
to 100% confidence. Gottesman and Lo further showed
that their procedure brings down the error rate whenever
the channel error rate is less than about 23.7% [11].
The Gottesman-Lo two-way privacy amplification pro-
cedure reviewed above can be improved in two ways.
First, there is no reason why one must apply LOCC2
EP and PEC alternately. Instead, Alice and Bob should
devise a suitable privacy amplification procedure based
on the estimated σx, σy and σz error rates of the qubits
transmitted through the insecure noisy channel. Besides,
they may use [r, 1, r]2 for some r > 3 as their phase error
correction code. In fact, using this approach, Gottes-
man and Lo proved that the six-state scheme can toler-
ant a bit error rate up to 26.4% [12]. Second, although
the asymmetric CSS code used by Gottesman and Lo
is known to exist using Gilbert-Varshamov type of argu-
ment [13], explicitly finding it may be difficult in general.
Fortunately, concatenated quantum CSS code is already
sufficient in handling the final error correction in the pri-
vacy amplification procedure. More importantly, various
concatenated quantum CSS codes and their decoding al-
gorithms are known.
Before I report my six-state scheme, I first call upon
two propositions below to study the effects of LOCC2 EP
and PEC on the error rates of the signal.
Proposition 1. Suppose Alice sends Bob several qubits
through a quantum channel whose σx, σy and σz error
rates due to either noise or eavesdropping are px, py and
pz respectively. Let pI = 1 − px − py − pz. If the error
suffered by each qubit is independent of the other, then
the error rates of the resultant qubits after going through
one around of LOCC2 EP are given by

pEPI =
p2I + p
2
z
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
,
pEPx =
p2x + p
2
y
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
,
pEPy =
2pxpy
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
,
pEPz =
2pIpz
(pI + pz)2 + (px + py)2
.
(1)
Furthermore, the error rate in each of the resultant qubit
after the LOCC2 EP is independent of each other.
Proof. Recall that in the LOCC2 EP, Alice and Bob ran-
domly pair up their corresponding shares of the qubits
and apply BXOR to each pair. During the BXOR opera-
tion, any σx error in the control qubit remains unaltered.
In contrast, the σz error of the resultant control qubit is
inherited from both the original control and target qubits
[15]. Since Alice and Bob reject the pair if the measure-
ment results of their share of target qubit differ, hence
the remaining control qubit is error-free if the error op-
erator acting on the original control and target qubits
equals I ⊗ I or σz ⊗ σz . Similarly, the remaining control
qubit suffers σx, σy, and σz errors if the error operator
acting on the original control and target qubits equals
σx ⊗ σx or σy ⊗ σy , σx ⊗ σy or σy ⊗ σx, and I ⊗ σz or
σz ⊗ I respectively. Since error suffered by each qubit
is independent of each other, hence Eq. (1) holds. The
independence of resultant error rates after the LOCC2
EP procedure follows directly from the independence of
channel error for the qubits received by Bob.
By Proposition 1 and mathematical induction, it is
straight-forward to check that the error rates of the re-
sultant qubits after going through k rounds of LOCC2
EP are given by

pkEPI = [(pI + pz)
2k + (pI − pz)2k ]/2D,
pkEPx = [(px + py)
2k + (px − py)2k ]/2D,
pkEPy = [(px + py)
2k − (px − py)2k ]/2D,
pkEPz = [(pI + pz)
2k − (pI − pz)2k ]/2D,
(2)
where D = (pI + px)
2k + (px + py)
2k . So whenever
pI > 1/2, p
kEP
I > 1/2 and p
kEP
z < 1/2. Further,
pkEPI , p
kEP
z → 1/2 and pkEPx , pkEPy → 0 as k →∞. That
is, repeated application of LOCC2 EP reduces σx and
σy errors at the expense of possibly increasing σz and
perhaps also the overall error rates.
Proposition 2. We use the notations in Proposition 1.
Suppose Alice and Bob divide their shared pairs into n
sets each containing r shared pairs. And then they per-
form one round of PEC using the [r, 1, r]2 majority vote
phase error correction code. The resultant error rates of
the signal after one round of PEC satisfy


pPECx + p
PEC
y ≤ r(px + py),
pPECy + p
PEC
z ≤ [4(pI + pz)(px + py)]r/2
≤ e−2r(0.5−pz−py)2 ,
(3)
provided that pI > 1/2. Also, the error rate in each of the
resultant qubit after PEC is independent of each other.
Proof. The idea of the proof is the same as that in Propo-
sition 1. Recall that the error syndrome of the [r, 1, r]2
phase error correction code is given by

1 1
1 1
...
. . .
1 1

 . (4)
3So, after measuring this error syndrome, the σz error
stays on the control qubit while the σx error propagates
from the control as well as all target qubits to the resul-
tant control qubit [15]. Therefore upon PEC, the resul-
tant control qubit is spin-flip error-free whenever there
is an even number of qubits amongst the r of them in
the same set suffering spin-flip error. Hence, the first
inequality in Eq. (3) holds. Similarly, the resultant con-
trol qubit suffers from phase-shift error provided that at
least ⌈(r − 1)/2⌉ out of the r qubits are suffering from
phase-shift error. Such a probability of occurrence equals∑
a≥⌈(r−1)/2⌉
(
r
a
)
(py+ pz)
a(pI + px)
r−a. Combining with
the inequality [16]
λn∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
pk(1−p)n−k ≤ λ−λn(1−λ)−(1−λ)npλn(1−p)(1−λ)n
(5)
for 0 < λ < p, we conclude that the probability of having
a phase error is upper bounded by [4(pI+px)(py+pz)]
r/2.
Thus, the first line of the second inequality in Eq. (3) is
satisfied. To arrive at the second line, one simply con-
siders the Taylor series expansion of log[1+ (2pI +2px−
1)]+log[1+(2py+2pz−1)] and uses the observation that
all odd power terms in the expansion are canceled.
Proposition 2 tells us that if 0.5−pz−py ≫ √px + py,
the phase error can be greatly reduced after one round
of PEC by choosing r ≈ 0.01/(px + py). Specifically,
with this choice of r, Eq. (3) implies that pPECy + p
PEC
z is
exponentially small while pPECx + p
PEC
y is at most about
1%.
Alice and Bob may exploit the dynamics of LOCC2
EP and PEC to perform their privacy amplification.
Specifically, they first repeatedly apply LOCC2 EP until
0.5 − pz − py ≫ √px + py. Then, applying PEC once
will bring the overall error rate px + py + pz down to an
acceptable value. And then, Alice and Bob may choose
to use the concatenated Steane’s seven qubit code in the
Shor-Preskill procedure. Recall that Steane’s seven qubit
code corrects one error out of seven qubits [14]. Thus, as
long as Alice and Bob randomly permute the bits before
applying the Shor-Preskill procedure, the overall error
rate that is almost surely tolerated by the concatenated
Steane’s seven qubit code is equal to the smallest positive
root of the equation
1− λ = (1− λ)7 + 7(1− λ)6λ, (6)
namely, about 5.8%. The upshot is that the error correc-
tion algorithm for the concatenated Steane’s seven qubit
code is known and can be carried out efficiently.
With these two improvements in mind, I write down
my modified six-state scheme below.
1. Alice preparesN qubits each randomly chosen from
|0〉, |1〉, |0〉 ± |1〉 and |0〉 ± i|1〉 and sends them to
Bob [10]. Bob acknowledges the reception of the
qubits and measures each of them randomly and in-
dependently along one of the following three bases:
{|0〉, |1〉}, {|0〉 ± |1〉} and {|0〉 ± i|1〉}. Then, Al-
ice and Bob publicly announce the bases they have
used to prepare or measure each qubit. They keep
only those qubits that are prepared and measured
in the same basis.
2. Alice and Bob estimate the channel error rate by
sacrificing a few qubits. Specifically, they divide
the qubits into three sets according to their bases
of measurement. They randomly pick O(log[1/ǫ])
qubits from each set and publicly compare the
preparation and measurement results of each cho-
sen qubit. In this way, they know the estimated
channel error rate with standard deviation ǫ. (De-
tail proof of this claim can be found in Ref. [4].) If
the estimated channel error rate is too high, they
abort the scheme and start over again.
3. Using the convention that |0〉, |0〉 − |1〉 and |0〉 −
i|1〉 represent a logical 0 while the |1〉, |0〉 + |1〉
and |0〉 + i|1〉 represent a logical 1, Alice and Bob
convert their untested measured qubits into secret
strings. Then, they perform the following privacy
amplification procedure on their secret bit strings.
(a) They apply the LOCC2 EP procedure pro-
posed by Gottesman and Lo in Ref. [11].
Specifically, they randomly pair up their cor-
responding secret bits and announce the pari-
ties of each pair. They keep the control bit in
each pair only if their announced parities for
the pair agree. They repeat the above LOCC2
EP procedure until there is an integer r > 0
such that the estimated quantum channel er-
ror given by Eq. (3) is less than 5%. They
abort the scheme either when such an integer
r is greater than the number of remaining bits
they have or when they have used up all their
bits in this procedure.
(b) They apply the PEC procedure introduced
by Gottesman and Lo in Ref. [11] using the
[r, 1, r]2 majority vote phase error correction
code once. Specifically, Alice and Bob ran-
domly divide the resultant bits into sets each
containing r bits. They replace each set by
the parity of the r bits in the set.
(c) Alice and Bob randomly permute the order
of their remaining bits and apply the Shor-
Preskill privacy amplification procedure [9]
to these bits with the concatenated Steane’s
seven qubit code. The level of concatenation
depends on the estimated worst case px+py+
pz given by Eq. (3) and the final required fi-
delity of the state. Specifically, suppose that
4the concatenated Steane’s seven qubit code is
constructed from two binary classical codes C1
and C2 satisfying C2 ⊂ C1. Alice randomly
picks a codeword u ∈ C1 and publicly an-
nounces the sum of u and her remaining bit
string modulo 2. Bob subtracts Alice’s an-
nounced bit string from his own remaining bit
string modulo 2; and then he applies the C2 er-
ror correction to recover the codeword u ∈ C1.
They use the coset u+C2 as their secret key.
To prove the security of the above scheme, I follow
the arguments of Refs. [3, 9, 11, 17]. First, since this is
a prepare-and-then-measure scheme, any Eve’s quantum
cheating strategy can be reduced to a classical one [3, 17].
Second, Eve does not know how Alice and Bob group the
qubit pairs in LOCC2 EP and PEC beforehand. Hence,
the resultant error rate after going through either LOCC2
EP or PEC depends only on the probabilities of σx,
σy and σz errors and the number of qubits transmitted
[3, 11]. Thus, to study the asymptotic error tolerable
rate of the above scheme, it suffices to consider cheating
strategies characterized only by px, py and pz respec-
tively. Since Alice chooses the six states randomly and
uniformly, the untested qubits can be regarded as having
passed through a depolarizing channel [11]. Hence, Alice
and Bob almost surely know that px = py = pz for their
untested qubits.
From Eq. (3) in Proposition 2, I know that after ap-
plying LOCC2 EP k times, PEC will bring the quantum
error rate down to, say, 5% if r = 0.04/(pkEPx + p
kEP
y )
and 2r(0.5 − pkEPz − pkEPy ) ≫ 1. Putting px = py =
pz = (1 − pI)/3 into Eq. (2), I conclude that this is pos-
sible when k → ∞ and (pI − pz)2 > (pI + pz)(px + py).
This condition implies that 20p2I − 10pI − 1 > 0 or
pI > 0.25+0.15
√
5. In other words, the above scheme tol-
erates a bit error rate up to px+py = 0.5−0.1
√
5 ≈ 27.6%
(which corresponds to a quantum channel error rate of
px + py + pz = 0.75− 0.15
√
5 ≈ 41.4%).
Besides, once Alice and Bob estimate the channel er-
ror rates, then they can efficiently compute the num-
ber of LOCC2 EP to be applied as well as the level of
concatenation for the Steane’s seven qubit code to be
used. Finally, the error syndrome of the concatenated
Steane’s seven qubit code as well as the corresponding
Shor-Preskill procedure are straight-forward to compute.
The 27.6% bit error rate bound reported here shows
that the six-state scheme is more noise resistant than the
BB84 scheme since no BB84 scheme can tolerate more
than 25% bit error [12]. In addition, the adaptive pri-
vacy amplification idea can be applied to increase the
error tolerant level in a number of QKD schemes. For
instance, the above adaptive privacy amplification pro-
cedure enables the BB84 to generate a provably secure
key whenever the bit error rate is less than 20.0% (or
equivalently, a quantum channel error rate of less than
39.9%). Besides, one can show the existence of a bi-
ased entanglement-based QKD scheme requiring quan-
tum computers whose key is provably secure whenever
the bit error rate is less than 33.3% [18].
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